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Statutory Interpretation in Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc. v.
Hinton and Why North Carolina Courts Should Apply Anti-tax
Avoidance Judicial Doctrines in Future Cases*
INTRODUCTION
Tax avoidance1 is as American as apple pie. Each year,
individuals, families, and businesses alter their behavior in ways
meant to decrease their federal, state, or local tax liabilities.2
Examples range from wealthy parents gifting stock to their children in
order to decrease the applicable marginal tax rate upon its sale,3 to
corporations identifying and navigating complex tax loopholes.4 As
* © 2010 Jeremy M. Wilson.
1. It is important to distinguish between tax avoidance and tax evasion. Tax
avoidance refers to taxpayers structuring transactions to yield the lowest possible tax
burden. Tax avoidance is not criminal although, as discussed in Part III, some tax benefits
might be disallowed. In contrast, tax evasion refers to taxpayers illegally failing to pay
taxes owed. See, e.g., Jean-Claude Goldsmith, Preface to INT'L BAR ASS'N, TAX
AVOIDANCE, TAX EVASION, at vii, vii (1982) [hereinafter TAX AVOIDANCE, TAX
EVASION] (discussing "the border line between the forbidden and allowed"); Michael
Doran, Tax Penalties and Tax Compliance, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 111, 124 n.69 (2009)
(referencing "the familiar but elusive distinction" between tax avoidance and tax evasion).
Tax avoidance has been described as the "legal structuring of conduct to avoid incurring
tax obligations," whereas tax evasion has been described as "illegal non-reporting of
income or non-payment of taxes." Doran, supra, at 124 n.69 (citing Michael G. Allingham
& Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 323, 323-
24 (1972)).
2. According to the IRS, the annual U.S. federal tax gap (defined as "the difference
between the amount of tax due from legal activities and the amount voluntarily paid by
taxpayers in a timely manner") is $300-$350 billion. George K. Yin, JCT Chief Discusses
the Tax Gap, 107 TAX NOTES 1449, 1449 (2005). The majority of this figure results from
"underreporting," which includes certain tax avoidance strategies such as "complex tax
shelter[s]." Id. This figure, however, only accounts for taxes that should have been paid
according to government officials. See id. The real revenue loss from behavior alteration is
therefore significantly higher.
3. See Mary Beth Franklin, Congress Closes Kiddie-Tax Loophole, KIPLINGER'S
PERS. FIN., June 6, 2007, http://www.kiplinger.com/features/archives/2007/06kidtax.html
(explaining how tax loopholes allowed wealthy individuals to gift stocks and other
financial assets to their children to decrease the family's overall tax, that gifts are not taxed
under the federal tax code, and that the capital gains rate varies depending on annual
income).
4. See, e.g., Phil Mintz & Jane Sasseen, Changing Corporate Tax Rules: A Tough
Road Ahead, Bus. WK., May 4, 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/
content/may2009/db2009054_337394.htm?chan=top+newstop+news+index+-+temp-jop
+story (explaining that the Obama administration hopes to raise $210 billion over ten
years by closing corporate tax loopholes that largely allow international companies to
"defer[] taxes on profits earned overseas indefinitely").
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the complexity of these tax loopholes increases, so does public
skepticism regarding tax avoidance. The 2009 North Carolina Court
of Appeals case Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc. v. Hinton' involved one
such example of complex corporate tax avoidance.
Wal-Mart had essentially developed a business structure that
decreased its corporate tax liability in several states by having its
store-owner subsidiary make rental payments to a recently
established real estate trust; the trust then cycled these payments back
to the original payor in the form of dividends.6 The store-owner
subsidiary deducted the rental payments from its state corporate
income taxes as a business expense, and under the state's tax code, it
owed no tax on the dividend payments received.7 Simply put, Wal-
Mart decreased its state tax liabilities by paying itself rent.8 In 2005,
the North Carolina Secretary of Revenue, Reginald Hinton,
responded to these actions by ordering Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc.
(corporate owner of all Wal-Mart stores in North Carolina and
twenty-nine other states) to pay roughly $20 million in back taxes plus
nearly $6 million in interest and close to $5 million in late payment
penalties.' The Department of Revenue based these figures on the
total tax owed when earnings of the various corporate entities
involved in the real estate payment system were combined for tax
purposes pursuant to state corporate income tax law.10 Wal-Mart
Stores East made the approximately $30 million payment and then
filed suit in state court, arguing that the Secretary of Revenue lacked
the statutory authority to order a forced combination."
In May 2009, the North Carolina Court of Appeals unanimously
upheld the Secretary's actions. 2 The size of the tax bill and the
5. __ N.C. App. -, 676 S.E.2d 634 (2009).
6. See Jesse Drucker, Wal-Mart Cuts Taxes by Paying Rent to Itself, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 1, 2007, at Al.
7. Id.
8. Jesse Drucker, Judge Rules Against Wal-Mart over Its Tax-Shelter Dispute, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 5, 2008, at A4.
9. Wal-Mart Stores East, - N.C. App. at -., 676 S.E.2d at 640-41.
10. Id. at __ 676 S.E.2d at 640.
11. Id. at .,676 S.E.2d at 641.
12. Id. at , 676 S.E.2d at 654. The court of appeals also filed a simultaneous decision
in an identical case involving Sam's East, Inc. (corporate owner of Sam's Club stores in
North Carolina) based on its reasoning in Wal-Mart Stores East. See Sam's East, Inc. v.
Hinton, __ N.C. App. -, 676 S.E.2d 654 (2009); see also Wal-Mart Stores East, _ N.C.
App. at -, 676 S.E.2d at 641 (indicating that the court planned to submit an opinion
regarding the Sam's East appeal simultaneously with its Wal-Mart Stores East opinion).
The Secretary of Revenue had assessed Sam's East $3.5 million in back taxes and penalties
resulting from the same tax avoidance strategy. Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc. v. Hinton, No.
1472 [Vol. 88
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closing of a popular tax loophole made Wal-Mart Stores East a
noteworthy decision. The case received a fair amount of national
media attention, 3 largely because Wal-Mart and several other
corporations utilized similar tax avoidance strategies in other states. 4
In North Carolina, Wal-Mart Stores East also represents an important
development for a state judiciary with a limited record of addressing
incidents of corporate tax avoidance, and it shines new light on the
state's difficulty in curbing instances of avoidance that border on the
edge of evasion. 5
This Recent Development argues that although the North
Carolina Court of Appeals reached the correct result from a public
policy standpoint in Wal-Mart Stores East, it did so after conducting an
incomplete statutory analysis. In conducting its statutory interpretation,
the court of appeals failed to consider the individual provisions of title
105, section 130.6 of the General Statutes of North Carolina 16 in pari
materia, and the court improperly distinguished the statute's legislative
history and law from other jurisdictions. Underlying this incomplete
analysis was the inability of the state's tax statutes to respond to new
and evolving corporate tax avoidance strategies. In future cases, North
Carolina courts should apply anti-tax avoidance judicial doctrines to
egregious cases of tax avoidance in which state officials lack clear
statutory authority to intervene. Anti-tax avoidance doctrines work
more broadly than specific tax statutes by allowing state officials to
disallow tax benefits that result from transactions structured solely to
reduce tax liabilities and that lack an independent economic purpose. 17
06-CVS-3928, slip op. at 3 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 31, 2007), affd, - N.C. App. __, 676
S.E.2d 634 (2009).
13. See, e.g., Gary D. Robertson, N.C. Appeals Court Upholds Tax Bill for Wal-Mart,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 20, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wirestory?id=7629615;
Al Norman, Court Says No to $33 Million Tax Rebate for Wal-Mart, HUFFINGTON POST,
May 19, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/al-norman/court-says-no-to-33-milli_b
_205568.html. Much of the media coverage occurred following the district court decision.
See, e.g., Drucker, supra note 8; Michael Nol & Ryan Flinn, Wal-Mart May Appeal $33.5
Million North Carolina Court Decision, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 6, 2008,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&refer=news&sid=aJEb2qzbDR9k.
14. See Drucker, supra note 6 (describing Wal-Mart's use of the tax avoidance
strategy and noting that other retailers and banks also utilize it).
15. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Clayton, 267 N.C. 15, 24, 147 S.E.2d 522, 529 (1966)
(stating that "exploring ways [for the corporation] to minimize taxes is as much a part of
its business as exploring for new sources of oil" and implicitly endorsing "[t]ax avoidance
by any means which the law permits"). Additionally, as discussed in Part I1.B, North
Carolina courts have not applied the useful tool of anti-tax avoidance judicial doctrines.
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-130.6 (2009).
17. Jeffrey C. Glickman & Clark R. Calhoun, The "States" of the Federal Common
Law Tax Doctrines, 61 TAX LAW. 1181, 1181-89 (2008); David A. Weisbach, An
2010] 1473
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Applying these doctrines would help North Carolina achieve
important policy benefits, including protecting state revenues,
providing for simpler tax law, promoting fairness between individual
and corporate taxpayers, and promoting economic efficiency. In
addition, limiting application to only the most egregious cases of tax
avoidance would minimize the negative consequences of applying
these doctrines. 8 Part I of this Recent Development discusses Wal-
Mart Stores East's relevant corporate structure and the North
Carolina Court of Appeals' decision. Part II examines the court's
statutory interpretation of section 105-130.6, arguing that the court
misapplied established principles of statutory construction. Part III
examines the relevant policy considerations and the use of anti-tax
avoidance judicial doctrines in other jurisdictions. It concludes by
recommending that North Carolina apply the doctrines in future
cases to combat egregious acts of tax avoidance.
I. SUMMARY OF WAL-MART STORES EAST
A. Wal-Mart Stores East's Relevant Corporate Structure
Wal-Mart is often viewed as one large retail business, but its
corporate structure is significantly more complicated. For the
purposes of Wal-Mart Stores East, the pertinent players were Wal-
Mart Stores East, Inc., Wal-Mart Property Company, and Wal-Mart
Real Estate Business Trust. The corporate structure that Wal-Mart
established between these subsidiaries is what allowed it to avoid
nearly $20 million in North Carolina corporate income taxes over the
four-year period between 1998 and 2002.19
While the particular details of how these entities interacted have
little bearing on this Recent Development's overall analysis, it is
important to note the complexity of Wal-Mart's tax avoidance
strategy. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (the primary Wal-Mart corporation)
owns Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc. ("Wal-Mart Stores East"), which
operates all the Wal-Mart stores in North Carolina and twenty-nine
Economic Analysis of Anti-tax-Avoidance Doctrines, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 88, 88-89
(2002).
18. Under the egregious/non-egregious distinction, those taxpayers who structure
transactions with zero economic purpose but to avoid taxes and who manage to keep
significant funds from the treasury would face enforcement, but others would not. See
infra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
19. Drucker, supra note 6 (describing how Wal-Mart decreased its state tax liability by
twenty percent over four years).
1474 [Vol. 88
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other states.20 In 1996, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. reorganized its corporate
structure in order to decrease state tax liabilities.21 As a result of the
reorganization, Wal-Mart Stores East became the sole owner of WSE
Investment, LLC.22 WSE Investment, LLC became the 99% owner of
Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, and Wal-Mart Stores East, LP became the
sole owner of Wal-Mart Property Company ("W-M PC"). 23 Wal-Mart
Stores East therefore had direct control over W-M PC even though
they were distinct business entities separated by two degrees of
corporate hierarchy. W-M PC owned all the voting shares of Wal-
Mart Real Estate Business Trust ("W-M REBT"), a Delaware-based
real estate investment trust ("REIT"). 24 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
transferred legal ownership of the land on which its retail stores were
located to W-M REBT.25 Wal-Mart Stores East then entered into
leases with W-M REBT for its individual retail stores, which included
at least eighty-two stores in North Carolina.26 In sum, W-M REBT
held all Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. real estate and was Wal-Mart Stores
East's landlord even though Wal-Mart Stores East controlled W-M
PC, which owned all the shares of W-M REBT.
This new "captive REIT ' '27 corporate structure allowed Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. to implement its tax avoidance strategy. Wal-Mart
Stores East made rental payments to W-M REBT for the land on
20. Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc. v. Hinton, - N.C. App .... 676 S.E.2d 634, 638
(2009).
21. Id.; see also Drucker, supra note 6. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. purchased this financial
plan from the accounting firm Ernst & Young. Drucker, supra note 6. It is fairly common
for financial firms to sell business strategies to corporations that can save them money,
such as by reducing state or federal tax liabilities. See id. Financial firms even go so far as
to patent these plans. See Floyd Norris, Patent Law Is Getting Tax Crazy, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Oct. 20, 2006, at 12.
22. Wal-Mart Stores East, __ N.C. App. at __, 676 S.E.2d at 638. Wal-Mart Stores East
also became the sole owner of WSE Management, LLC. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. A real estate investment trust ("REIT") is simply "[a] company that invests in
and manages a portfolio of real estate, with the majority of the trust's income distributed
to its shareholders." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1378 (9th ed. 2009). "Congress created
REITs in 1960 as a way to allow smaller investors to put money in a wide portfolio of
commercial real estate, spreading their risk." Drucker, supra note 6. To incentivize the use
of REITs, Congress also granted them favorable tax treatment: "REITs aren't subject to
corporate income tax on the profits they pay to shareholders as long as they pay out at
least 90% of the profits." Id.
25. Wal-Mart Stores East, __ N.C. App. at -, 676 S.E.2d at 639.
26. Id. This figure includes both lease and sublease arrangements. Id.
27. The term "captive REIT" is used to refer to corporate structures in which
businesses benefit from REITs that remain essentially under their control. See Drucker,
supra note 6.
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which its individual retail stores were located.28 Wal-Mart Stores East
then deducted the rental payments as a business expense on its North
Carolina corporate income tax filings.29 Once W-M REBT received
these rental payments, it paid them back to W-M PC (its one hundred
percent shareholder) as dividends.3" W-M PC then transferred the
majority of these funds back to Wal-Mart Stores East.31 Wal-Mart
Stores East did not have to pay taxes on the dividend payments under
North Carolina law. 32 The end result was that Wal-Mart Stores East
kept nearly the same amount of income it would have had under the
pre-1996 corporate structure. However, it did not pay state taxes on
the rent paid to W-M REBT even though almost all the money came
back as dividend payments. 33 This strategy decreased Wal-Mart
Stores East's North Carolina corporate income taxes by nearly $20
million over a four-year period.34
28. Wal-Mart Stores East, __ N.C. App. at -, 676 S.E.2d at 639.
29. Id.
30. See id at __, 676 S.E.2d at 640; Drucker, supra note 6.
31. Wal-Mart Stores East, __ N.C. App. at -, 676 S.E.2d at 639-40.
32. See id; Drucker, supra note 6. Because dividends received by a parent corporation
from a subsidiary normally are not taxed, Wal-Mart Stores East was able to deduct the
dividend payments as nonbusiness income under title 105, section 130.4 of the General
Statutes of North Carolina. Wal-Mart Stores East, __ N.C. App. at __ & n.3, 676 S.E.2d at
639-40 & n.3 (describing the application of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-130.4); see also
Drucker, supra note 6 (explaining that laws "on the state level" allow "companies to
receive dividends tax-free from their subsidiaries"). North Carolina also did not tax W-M
REBT on the original dividend payment. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-130.12 (2005)
(amended 2007) (stating that a REIT "shall be taxed under this Part upon only that part of
its net income which is not distributed or declared for distribution to shareholders"); see
also Wal-Mart Stores East, __ N.C. App. at -, 676 S.E.2d at 639-40 (describing the
method by which W-M REBT deducted as a dividend payment nearly all of its would-be
taxable income). Furthermore, W-M PC did not owe any Delaware taxes on the dividend
payments because of the Delaware tax code's complete exemption for corporate dividend
payments. See Drucker, supra note 6. In 2007, the North Carolina General Assembly
amended section 105-130.12 to include dividend payments in the taxable income of a
"captive REIT." Act of July 31, 2007, ch. 323, § 31.18(c), 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 616, 941-42
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-130.12 (2009)). The amendment was in response to the
captive REIT tax avoidance structure utilized by Wal-Mart and other corporations. See
infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
33. Drucker, supra note 6.
34. Wal-Mart Stores East, - N.C. App. at -, 676 S.E.2d at 640 ($4.18 million for the
1998-99 tax period, $4.85 million for 1999-2000, $5.68 million for 2000-01, and $5.15
million for 2001-02). Take Wal-Mart Stores East's 1998-99 North Carolina tax returns as
an example: $3.17 billion in total net income; deducted $1.66 billion in rent paid to W-M
REBT as a business expense and subtracted out $1.27 billion in dividend income from W-
M PC; under section 105-130.4, it apportioned 4.1625% of these figures to North Carolina
(based on the percentage of total business done inside the state). Id. at - & n.2, 676
S.E.2d at 639-40 & n.2. Thus, Wal-Mart Stores East's tax return stated that it had earned
$78.64 million in North Carolina taxable income, resulting in a total tax of $5.7 million
(instead of the $9.9 million it would have owed without the tax avoidance strategy). Id. at
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B. North Carolina Department of Revenue Action and Subsequent
Litigation
The North Carolina Department of Revenue audited Wal-Mart
Stores East's 1998-99 returns and concluded that the company had
underpaid its corporate income taxes.35 Specifically, the Department
of Revenue stated that the income reports of Wal-Mart Stores East,
W-M PC, and W-M REBT should all have been combined in order to
determine Wal-Mart Stores East's actual earnings within the state.36
Combining these three corporate entities resulted in an additional $4
million owed to the state for the 1998-99 tax period.3 7 The
Department of Revenue also assessed nearly $1.7 million in interest
and a $1 million penalty for 1998-99.38 After completing similar
calculations for the 1999-2000, 2000-01, and 2001-02 tax periods, the
Department of Revenue ordered a total payment of approximately
$27 million.39
Wal-Mart Stores East paid the $27 million, but it then filed suit
against the North Carolina Secretary of Revenue in March 2006 for a
refund pursuant to title 105, section 267 of the North Carolina
General Statutes.n° Wal-Mart Stores East's complaint alleged that the
assessment issued by the Department of Revenue was illegal in that
the Secretary had no authority-statutory or otherwise-to force a
combination of Wal-Mart Stores East, W-M PC, and W-M REBT.4
The trial judge granted summary judgment for the state, and Wal-
Mart appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals.42 In its May
- 676 S.E.2d at 640. W-M REBT's 1998-99 tax return reported $1,208,178,874 in total
income but then deducted $1,207,831,069 in dividend payments (that were going to W-M
PC and then to Wal-Mart Stores East); after the appropriate apportionment and tax
calculations, W-M REBT owed only $786 in taxes to North Carolina. Id. at _ & n.4, 676
S.E.2d at 640 & n.4.
35. Id. at , 676 S.E.2d at 640.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at __ 676 S.E.2d at 641.
40. Id. Section 105-267 has since been repealed, but at the time of the suit, it allowed
taxpayers to sue the Secretary of Revenue in state court if a tax was improperly assessed
and they were subsequently denied a refund. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-267 (2005), repealed
by Act of Aug. 30, 2007, ch. 491, § 2, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 1460, 1468-69. Session Law
2007-491 altered the tax dispute process by providing for more thorough administrative
review procedures. See Act of Aug. 30, 2007, ch. 491, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 1460.
41. Wal-Mart Stores East, - N.C. App. at __, 676 S.E.2d at 641.
42. Id. Wal-Mart Stores East made three arguments on appeal: (1) the statutes that
the Secretary of Revenue claimed gave him the power to force a taxable combination of
Wal-Mart Stores East, W-M PC, and W-M REBT (particularly section 105-130.6)
provided no such authority; (2) if the statutes did authorize such a combination, the tax
2010] 1477
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2009 ruling, the court of appeals found for the state and consequently
affirmed the trial court's decision.43
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 105-130.6
The North Carolina Court of Appeals was undoubtedly struck by
the perceived unfairness of a multi-billion dollar corporation using a
blatant tax shelter to avoid contributing its share of state taxes. The
opinion treated the statutory interpretation of section 105-130.6 as an
easy question. Based upon application of statutory construction
principles, North Carolina case law, and law from other jurisdictions,
the court found that the Secretary had the authority to force a
combination of the Wal-Mart corporate entities.' However, the
statutory interpretation question was closer than the court admitted.
The court of appeals read the forced combination provision in
isolation from the rest of the statute, and the court improperly
distinguished the statute's legislative history and law from other
jurisdictions.
A. Competing Interpretations of Section 105-130.6
The relevant language of section 105-130.6 reads as follows:
The net income of a corporation doing business in this State
that is a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of another corporation
shall be determined by eliminating all payments to or charges
by the parent, subsidiary, or affiliated corporation in excess of
fair compensation in all intercompany transactions of any kind
whatsoever. If the Secretary finds as a fact that a report by a
corporation does not disclose the true earnings of the
corporation on its business carried on in this State, the Secretary
may require the corporation to file a consolidated return of the
entire operations of the parent corporation and of its
subsidiaries and affiliates, including its own operations and
income. The Secretary shall determine the true amount of net
income earned by such corporation in this State. The combined
net income of the corporation and of its parent, subsidiaries,
and affiliates shall be apportioned to this State by use of the
assessments were unconstitutional; and (3) the negligence penalties against Wal-Mart
Stores East were improperly assessed. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 1, 9, Wal-Mart
Stores East, - N.C. App. __, 676 S.E.2d 634 (No. COA08-450). This Recent Development
analyzes the first of these issues.
43. Wal-Mart Stores East, - N.C. App. at _,_, 676 S.E.2d at 634, 654.
44. See id. at -, 676 S.E.2d at 641-47.
1478 [Vol. 88
WAL-MART STORES EAST, INC.
applicable apportionment formula required to be used by the
corporation under G.S. 105-130.4. 45
The statutory interpretation issue in Wal-Mart Stores East
involved determining under what circumstances the second sentence
of section 105-130.6 authorized the Secretary of Revenue to force a
combination of individual corporate entities, thereby requiring them
to file a consolidated tax return.4 The state argued that the statute
authorized a forced combination in any case where a taxpayer's "true
earnings" were somehow distorted.47 The state interpreted "true
earnings" expansively, meaning something akin to the amount of
income that officials could fairly attribute to activity within North
Carolina.48 Wal-Mart Stores East argued that this standard was too
broad and that the statute only authorized forced combination in
cases of non-arm's length dealing.49 Where individual corporate
entities conducted business at arm's length, as the Wal-Mart affiliates
had done (by carrying out independent business activities and dealing
at fair market prices), the statute did not allow forced combination."
Wal-Mart Stores East pointed out that North Carolina is a "separate
return" state where individual companies, even if they are affiliated,
file separate returns except in the rarest of circumstances.51
In support of its non-arm's length interpretation, Wal-Mart
Stores East argued that the first two sentences of section 105-130.6
were intended to be read together.52 Specifically, the first sentence
allows the Secretary of Revenue to eliminate individual payments
from a business's reported income when corporate affiliates are
overpaying each other in order to transfer earnings from North
Carolina to a lower-tax state.53 This situation involves non-arm's
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-130.6 (2009) (emphasis added).
46. See Wal-Mart Stores East, __ N.C. App. at -, 676 S.E.2d at 641-42.
47. See Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc. v. Hinton, No. 06-CVS-3928, slip op. at 5-6 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Dec. 31, 2007), af'd, - N.C. App. -, 676 S.E.2d 634 (2009).
48. See id.
49. Wal-Mart Stores East, __ N.C. App. at -, 676 S.E.2d at 642. Arm's length
transactions are those "between two unrelated and unaffiliated parties" or "between two
parties, however closely related they may be, conducted as if the parties were strangers, so
that no conflict of interest arises." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1635 (9th ed. 2009). Non-
arm's length dealing occurs when affiliated parties structure transactions under unequal
terms, such as non-market prices. See, e.g., Montgomery Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United
States, 615 F.2d 1318, 1329-30 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (describing the "nonarm's-length nature" of
rental payments that were "not sufficient to cover the fair rental value" and that had been
"fixed by [a] family unit").
50. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 42, at 8.
51. Id. at 7-8.
52. See id. at 9-11.
53. See id. at 9-10.
2010] 1479
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length dealing since the transactions are at non-market rates. 4 The
second sentence provides similar authority, but allows the Secretary
to simply force a combination of the corporate entities, such as when
he cannot identify specific instances of non-arm's length dealing but
nevertheless has evidence it is occurring.5
Wal-Mart Stores East's proposed interpretation of section 105-
130.6 is illustrated by the following example: Consider a Virginia-
based shoe company that has a subsidiary that operates retail shoe
stores in North Carolina.5 6 If North Carolina has higher tax rates than
Virginia, the parent company has an incentive to "sell" its shoes to
the North Carolina subsidiary at prices above market rates in order to
transfer as much income as possible from North Carolina to Virginia,
thereby decreasing its overall taxes. The first sentence of section 105-
130.6 would allow the Secretary of Revenue to eliminate individual
overpayments from the North Carolina retailer's tax filings (thus
giving it more taxable income in North Carolina). The second
sentence would allow the Secretary to force the two companies to file
a combined return so that any overpayments are automatically
cancelled out by the parent company's corresponding income
received. The second option would be useful when specific instances
of overpayment were difficult to identify but when evidence (such as
years of surprising business losses for the subsidiary) nevertheless
indicated non-arm's length dealing was occurring. According to Wal-
Mart Stores East, however, the state could not force a combination
under either option absent evidence of non-arm's length dealing.57
Despite Wal-Mart Stores East's argument, the court of appeals
examined the forced combination provision independent of the first
sentence. 8 The court concluded that the second sentence of the
statute gives the Secretary of Revenue broad authority to order
combined reporting in cases where he determines that a corporation
has not reported its "true earnings."59 The court noted that no
54. See id. at 10.
55. Id.
56. This discussion is based on a similar example provided in an amicus curiae brief
filed in support of Wal-Mart Stores East. See Brief for North Carolina Chamber of
Commerce & North Carolina Retail Merchs. Ass'n as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-
Appellant at 7, Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc. v. Hinton, __ N.C. App. -, 676 S.E.2d 634
(2009) (No. COA08-450) [hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief] (referencing M.S.
Breckenridge, Tax Escape by Manipulations of Holding Company, 9 N.C. L. REV. 189, 190
(1931)).
57. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 42, at 11.
58. See Wal-Mart Stores East, - N.C. App. at __, 676 S.E.2d at 642.
59. Id.
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language in the second sentence limits application to "intercompany
transactions at amounts other than fair value" (non-arm's length
dealing).6' Thus, the court's interpretation was that the plain language
of the statute supported an expansive interpretation of the Secretary's
authority.6 The court stated that the "essential meaning" of the term
"true earnings" simply describes the constitutional limits on states
taxing multi-state business activity that the U.S. Supreme Court has
outlined.62 The court then rejected any interpretation of "true
earnings" limited to arm's length dealing.63
The court of appeals correctly stated that plain language
interpretations are the preferable approach to statutory analysis.'
This is because the underlying aim of statutory construction is to
determine legislative intent,65 and when statutory language is clear
and unambiguous, courts should assume that the language represents
legislative intent.66 However, context matters when making these
determinations.67 By ignoring the statutory context in which the
forced combination language appears, the court disregarded the well-
established statutory construction principle of in pari materia. Under
in pari materia, segments of a statute should be read holistically where
several parts of a statute deal with similar subject matter.' Like with
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. Id. at __, 676 S.E.2d at 643 (citing Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 504
U.S. 768, 772-73 (1992); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 436-37
(1980)).
63. Id. at 676 S.E.2d at 642-43.
64. Id. at __ 676 S.E.2d at 642 (quoting Proposed Assessments v. Jefferson-Pilot Life
Ins. Co., 161 N.C. App. 558, 560, 589 S.E.2d 179, 181 (2003)); see also Jimenez v.
Quarterman, 129 S. Ct. 681, 685 (2009) ("As with any question of statutory interpretation,
our analysis begins with the plain language of the statute.").
65. Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134,
137 (1990) ("The primary rule of construction of a statute is to ascertain the intent of the
legislature and to carry out such intention to the fullest extent." (citing Buck v. U.S. Fid. &
Guar. Co., 265 N.C. 285, 290, 144 S.E.2d 34, 37 (1965))).
66. Diaz v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 360 N.C. 384, 387, 628 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2006) ("When the
language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity, it is the duty of this Court to give
effect to the plain meaning of the statute, and judicial construction of legislative intent is
not required." (citing Burgess, 326 N.C. at 209, 388 S.E.2d at 136)).
67. See Perkins v. Ark. Trucking Servs., 351 N.C. 634, 638, 528 S.E.2d 902, 904 (2000)
("In the absence of a contextual definition, courts may look to dictionaries to determine the
ordinary meaning of words within a statute." (emphasis added) (citing Black v. Littlejohn,
312 N.C. 626, 638, 325 S.E.2d 469, 478 (1985); State v. Martin, 7 N.C. App. 532, 533, 173
S.E.2d 47,48 (1970))).
68. See Brown v. Flowe, 349 N.C. 520, 524, 507 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1998) ("Our task is to
give effect, if possible, to all sections of each statute and to harmonize them into one law
on the subject." (citing Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 180-81, 261 S.E.2d 849, 854
(1980))); MMR Holdings, LLC v. City of Charlotte, 174 N.C. App. 540, 545, 621 S.E.2d
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any form of communication, taking language out of context can
produce unintended results. The North Carolina Court of Appeals
has consequently stated that "where a literal interpretation of the
language of a statute would contravene the manifest purpose of the
statute, the reason and purpose of the law will be given effect and the
strict letter thereof disregarded."6 9
Reading the statute as a whole, it seems reasonable that the
second sentence of section 105-130.6 should be considered alongside
the first sentence, which is clearly aimed at situations in which
corporate affiliates are overpaying each other in order to transfer
income to lower-tax states. Under the first sentence, addressing these
non-arm's length transactions would prove difficult when the
Secretary could not identify specific instances of overpayment.
Combined reporting addresses this problem by automatically
cancelling out the transfers when the corporate entities are combined
together for tax purposes. The fact that "true earnings" is not a
defined term in the North Carolina statutes further supports an in
pari materia reading. Although the court referenced the U.S.
Supreme Court cases Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Division of
Taxation ° and Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes7' as
providing the correct meaning of "true earnings,"72 the term "true
earnings" does not appear in either case.73 Hence, the court of appeals
was inaccurate in claiming that it was "consider[ing] the meaning of
the word or phrase in cases where the word or phrase has been
defined. ' 74  While these cases do discuss the constitutional
requirements in determining the amount of a multi-state business's
earnings that individual states can tax,75 ascribing this concept to the
General Assembly's intended meaning of "true earnings" requires
210, 213 (2005) ("A court 'does not read segments of a statute in isolation. Rather, we
construe statutes in pari materia, giving effect, if possible, to every provision.' " (quoting
Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 188, 594 S.E.2d 1, 20 (2004))).
69. In re A.C.F., 176 N.C. App. 520, 523, 626 S.E.2d 729, 732 (2006) (quoting In re
Banks, 295 N.C. 236, 240, 244 S.E.2d 386, 389 (1978)).
70. 504 U.S. 768 (1992).
71. 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
72. See Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc. v. Hinton, - N.C. App .... 676 S.E.2d 634,
642-43 (2009).
73. Nor does the term "true earnings" appear in any of the cases to which Allied-
Signal and Mobil Oil cite in the portions of these two opinions referenced by the court of
appeals. See Allied Signal, 504 U.S. at 772-73; Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 436-40.
74. Wal-Mart Stores East, __ N.C. App. at -, 676 S.E.2d at 643 (citing Duke Power
Co. v. Clayton, 274 N.C. 505,513-14, 164 S.E.2d 289, 295 (1968)).
75. See Allied-Signal, 504 U.S. at 772-73; Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 436-37.
1482 [Vol. 88
WAL-MART STORES EAST, INC.
greater analytical support.76 Finally, references to "true amount of net
income" and "net income" immediately following the forced
combination provision in section 105-130.6 suggest that the court's
broad definition of "true earnings" is outside the statute's scope.
If the court of appeals wanted to accurately effectuate legislative
intent, it would have seriously considered the possibility that the
forced combination provision was meant to reinforce the somewhat
limited remedy provided by the first sentence of section 105-130.6.
Such an analysis would then require examining additional indicators
of legislative intent, including the historical context surrounding
enactment and the use of similar provisions in other jurisdictions.7
The court did address each of these issues, but as described below, it
addressed them in an inadequate manner.
B. Legislative History of Section 105-130.6
The court of appeals made no real attempt to examine the
legislative history of section 105-130.6.7" The court's discussion of the
legislative history consisted solely of addressing Wal-Mart Stores
East's citation of a 1941 law review article that described amendments
made to the previous version of the statute.79 However, a thorough
statutory interpretation would have required more detailed analysis.
Prior to 1941, the predecessor to section 105-130.6 read as follows:
The net income of a corporation which is a subsidiary of
another corporation or closely affiliated therewith by stock
ownership shall be determined by eliminating all payments to
the parent corporation or affiliated corporations in excess of
fair value and by including fair compensation to such foreign
76. The reaction some observers had to the broad way in which the court of appeals
defined "true earnings" is noteworthy. See, e.g., KPMG.com, North Carolina: State
Appeals Court Upholds Forced Combination of Affiliated Entities, TAXNEWSFLASH-U.S.,
May 27, 2009, http://us.kpmg.com/microsite/taxnewsflash/2009/May/09242.html ("The
appeals court's definition of 'true earnings' leaves taxpayers with some uncertainty ....
Applying such a definition of 'true earnings' to determine when a combined return is
appropriate provides the state with considerable power.").
77. See In re Banks, 295 N.C. 236, 239, 244 S.E.2d 386, 389 (1978) (listing "the law as it
prevailed before the statute, the mischief to be remedied, the remedy, [and] the end to be
accomplished" as factors courts should consider in determining legislative intent (quoting
State v. Partlow, 91 N.C. 550, 552 (1884))); Morton Bldgs., Inc. v. Tolson, 172 N.C. App.
119, 127, 615 S.E.2d 906, 912 (2005) (recognizing that law from "other jurisdictions" can
"be instructive" even if it is "not binding" (citing Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Servs.
Corp., 350 N.C. 449, 465, 515 S.E.2d 675, 686 (1999))).
78. See Wal-Mart Stores East, __ N.C. App. at -, 676 S.E.2d at 644.
79. Id. See infra notes 89-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the law review
article.
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corporation for all commodities sold to or service performed
for the parent corporation or affiliated corporations. For the
purposes of determining such net income the Commissioner
may, in the absence of satisfactory evidence to the contrary,
presume that an apportionment by reasonable rules of the
consolidated net income of corporations participating in the
filing of a consolidated return of net income to the Federal
Government fairly reflects the net income taxable under this
chapter, or may otherwise equitably determine such net income
by reasonable rules of apportionment of the combined income
of the subsidiary, its parent and affiliates or any thereof."0
The "such net income" language seems to reference the first
sentence of the statute, indicating that the non-arm's length dealing
requirement carried forward to the forced combination provision.
Other states still have language similar to this version of the statute,
and the courts have read the second sentence as containing a non-
arm's length standard.8' Thus, the original purpose of section 105-
130.6 was to allow tax officials to address non-arm's length dealing
when they had evidence of specific overpayments. They could then
determine the correct net income figures either by individually
eliminating excess payments or by simply requiring a combined
return.
The "true earnings" language was added to the statute in 1941.82
The General Assembly also added further language at this same time,
which required a finding that "the business in this State is handled or
affected in such manner as to distort or not reflect the true income" in
order to authorize a forced combination.83 Therefore, the central issue
concerning the statute's legislative history is whether the 1941
amendments were meant to remove the non-arm's length
requirement from the forced combination provision. Unlike the court
of appeals, the trial judge considered this question, and he found it
significant that the amended language did not "carry forward any
requirement that the Secretary must first find that there are
intercompany transactions in excess of fair compensation."' Despite
the trial judge's conclusion, there is evidence that the forced
80. Act of May 9, 1935, ch. 371, § 318 1/2, 1935 N.C. Pub. L. 429, 549-50 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-130.6 (2009)) (emphasis added).
81. See infra notes 99-109 and accompanying text.
82. Act of Feb. 28, 1941, ch. 50, § 5(f), 1941 N.C. Pub. L. 66, 74 (codified as amended
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-130.6 (2009)).
83. Id.
84. Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc. v. Hinton, No. 06-CVS-3928, slip op. at 16 (N.C. Super.
Ct. Dec. 31, 2007), affd, - N.C. App. -, 676 S.E.2d 634 (2009).
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combination provision retained a non-arm's length standard. The
General Assembly placed limits on tax officials' power by imposing
the additional requirement that "the [Secretary] further find[] that the
business in this State is handled or affected in such manner as to
distort or not reflect the true income,"85 and an independent tax
statute predating section 105-130.6 suggests that the "distort"
language was itself a reference to non-arm's length dealing.8 6 It is
likely that the new language was meant to plainly authorize tax
officials to force a combination based on circumstantial evidence of
non-arm's length dealing (such as a subsidiary consistently losing
money while a parent company profited) instead of having to identify
specific overpayments.87 This interpretation would have expanded the
Secretary's power, but not to the point of authorizing a combined
return whenever he decided that income is fairly attributable to North
Carolina. And this authority would have been useful given the
asymmetric information between corporations and state officials
concerning specific intercompany pricing levels."
The court of appeals' only discussion of legislative history
concerned Wal-Mart Stores East's citation to a 1941 North Carolina
Law Review article addressing the amendments made to the statute.89
Wal-Mart Stores East referenced the article in arguing that the
current forced combination provision contains a non-arm's length
standard. 9 The article stated that
the new [forced combination] provision goes further than
simply authorizing specific contracts or credits or charges
between parent and subsidiary to be revised or disregarded in
determining the latter's taxable income.... [B]ut the new
provision will, if valid, authorize consideration of the system's
entire income without finding any unfairness or unwarranted
85. Act of Feb. 28, 1941, ch. 50, § 5(f), 1941 N.C. Pub. L. at 74-75.
86. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-130.16(b) (2009) ("When ... any corporation so
conducts its trade or business in such manner as to either directly or indirectly distort its
true net income and the net income properly attributable to the State, whether by the
arbitrary shifting of income, through price fixing, charges for service, or otherwise .... the
Secretary may require any facts the Secretary considers necessary for the proper
computation of the entire net income and the net income properly attributable to the State
...."); see also Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 42, at 23-24 (arguing that section
105-130.16 could apply only to non-arm's length transactions); Amici Curiae Brief, supra
note 56, at 7-8 (same).
87. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 42, at 10.
88. See id. at 11.
89. Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc. v. Hinton, __ N.C. App .... 676 S.E.2d 634, 644
(2009) (citing Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 42, at 11).
90. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 42, at 11.
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bookkeeping methods in connection with specific intercompany
transactions. 91
Interestingly, the court of appeals concluded that this language
actually cut against Wal-Mart Stores East's position. 92 The court said
the language suggesting that there need not be any "finding [of]
unfairness ... in connection with specific intercompany transactions"
supported granting broad authority to the Secretary of Revenue
whenever a company's income appears unfairly distorted. 93 The
article, however, is consistent with Wal-Mart Stores East's
interpretation of the statute.94 Under the amended statute, tax
officials would be able to intervene based on circumstantial evidence
of non-arm's length dealing even though they were unable to identify
individual, non-arm's length transactions (i.e., "specific intercompany
transactions"). Further, the previous paragraph of the article refers to
instances where "it can be shown that over a long period of years the
[corporate] system as a whole has earned money while the subsidiary
operating in this state, though doing a substantial business with the
system and the public, has nominally earned none."95 Such an
earnings differential is the very type of evidence that would indicate
non-arm's length dealing because transactions under nonmarket
prices would lead to disproportionate earnings between affiliates. The
Secretary of Revenue would be able to deal with these instances of
non-arm's length dealing in the aggregate through forced
combination even though he had not identified specific, non-arm's
length transactions. At the very least, the court of appeals was
incorrect to assert that Secretary Hinton's actions were "exactly the
type of example noted in the [North Carolina Law Review] article as a
reason for enacting the second sentence of the statute., 96
Finally, recent legislative history may support Wal-Mart Stores
East's position. In 2007, the General Assembly amended the state tax
code to include dividend payments in the taxable income of captive
REITs.97 The legislature's action was in response to captive REIT tax
avoidance schemes, and Wal-Mart Stores East argued that the
91. A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1941, 19 N.C. L. REV. 435,
534-35 (1941) [hereinafter A Survey of Statutory Changes].
92. Wal-Mart Stores East, - N.C. App. at -, 676 S.E.2d at 644.
93. Id. (quoting A Survey of Statutory Changes, supra note 91, at 535).
94. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 42, at 11.
95. A Survey of Statutory Changes, supra note 91, at 534.
96. Wal-Mart Stores East, __ N.C. App. at -, 676 S.E.2d at 644.
97. Act of July 30, 2007, ch. 323, § 31.18(c), 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 616, 941 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-130.12 (2009)); see Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 42, at
27-28.
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amendment demonstrated the legislature's belief that section 105-
130.6 did not authorize the Department of Revenue to address
captive REIT tax avoidance strategies.98 The implication is that the
General Assembly would not have passed a new law if the Secretary
of Revenue already had the requisite statutory authority.
C. Other Jurisdictions' Forced Combination Provisions
In addition to its inadequate legislative history analysis, the court
distinguished legal authority from other jurisdictions that suggested
Wal-Mart Stores East's construction of section 105-130.6 was, in fact,
correct. The forced combination statutes in Georgia and
Massachusetts both contain essentially the same language as the
original version of section 105-130.6. 99 The statutes provide state tax
officials authority to either "eliminat[e] all payments ... in excess of
fair value"' ° or to determine taxes based on "combined income."10'
Interpretations of each of these statutes support the conclusion that
the original purpose of the section 105-130.6 forced combination
provision was to address instances of non-arm's length dealing. Both
a Court of Appeals of Georgia opinion10 2 and the current Georgia
98. Wal-Mart Stores East argued:
Early in 2006 the General Assembly was told that the law applied exactly as
Plaintiff is contending in this matter and that legislative action was needed to
change the law effectively to achieve the result sought by Defendant here. The
legislature did ultimately take action and amended the statutes, effective January
1,2007.
Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 42, at 27-28 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-130.12
(2009)). The counterargument is that the General Assembly simply wanted to provide the
Department of Revenue an additional tool to address similar tax avoidance schemes (the
name of the amendment was "Alternative for Addressing a Corporation's Attempt to
Avoid State Taxes Through the Use of a REIT"). See Act of July 30, 2007, ch. 323,
§ 31.18(c), 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws at 941. The legislation clearly stated that it was not meant
to undermine the Department's power under section 105-130.6. See § 31.18(e).
99. See GA. CODE ANN. § 48-7-31(e) (2009); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 63, § 39A
(LexisNexis 2008).
100. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 63, § 39A.
101. GA. CODE ANN. § 48-7-31(e).
102. Blackmon v. Campbell Sales Co., 189 S.E.2d 474, 477 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972). The
Court of Appeals of Georgia stated that
[i]n our opinion the two sentences must be read together, the second as limited by
the first, which as a mandatory rule has priority. Thus, in order to exercise the
discretion under the second rule the Commissioner must find that the income of
the taxpayer cannot be adjusted in the manner first prescribed. To hold otherwise
would reflect a determination that the second sentence gives him an unbridled
discretion to resort to the unitary theory even though the taxpayer has done
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Code of Regulations10 3 state that forced combination is available only
when non-arm's length dealing has occurred. 1"4 Similarly, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court interpreted its state's statute
to require non-arm's length dealing in Polaroid Corp. v.
Commissioner.1 5 The court observed that "words of a statute must be
construed in association with other statutory language and the
general statutory plan" and that "[m]ost of § 39A concerns the
problem of ... less than arm's length transactions between
affiliates."'" The North Carolina Court of Appeals distinguished the
Georgia and Massachusetts statutes on the grounds that their forced
combination provisions do not reference "true earnings.""1 7 This
distinction, however, is unconvincing absent evidence that the
General Assembly intended the "true earnings" language to expand
the scope of North Carolina's forced combination provision beyond
non-arm's length dealing.
Moreover, the North Carolina Court of Appeals made no
mention of the other jurisdictions' statutes cited by Wal-Mart Stores
East in its appellate brief,1 8 including the Florida forced combination
statute." 9 The Florida statute permits forced combination "if the
filing of separate returns ... would improperly reflect the taxable
incomes of such corporations." ''" Supporting Wal-Mart's statutory
argument is the fact that Florida state officials have interpreted this
language as requiring a finding of non-arm's length dealing before the
Commissioner could force a combination."' Importantly, Florida
requires non-arm's length dealing even given its broad standard of
"improperly reflect[ing] the taxable incomes '"112 and the lack of any
everything the law requires, or even though the Commissioner could adjust the
return to reflect what the law requires.
Id.
103. GA. COMP. R. & REGs. 560-7-8.07(3) (2009) ("[I]f it is found that affiliates are in
fact dealing at arms length, operating, buying and selling, and otherwise dealing with each
other as if they were not affiliated, consolidation will not apply.").
104. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 42, at 14 (discussing Georgia case law
and regulations regarding when forced combination is permissible).
105. 472 N.E.2d 259, 265 (Mass. 1984) (holding that non-arm's length dealing must
exist for the Commissioner to require a forced combination).
106. Id. at 264.
107. Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc. v. Hinton, - N.C. App .... 676 S.E.2d 634, 646
(2009).
108. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 42, at 13-15.
109. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 220.131 (West 2009). Wal-Mart Stores East also cited authority
from Mississippi and New Jersey. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 42, at 13, 15.
110. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 220.131(2).
111. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 12C-1.0131(2) (2009).
112. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 220.131.
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statutory language referencing overpayment between corporate
affiliates. Florida therefore retains a non-arm's length standard
despite having a statute that conceivably could be interpreted more
broadly (much like the "true earnings" language in section 105-130.6).
Even if the above criticisms did not necessarily compel a ruling in
favor of Wal-Mart Stores East, a complete treatment of the relevant
statutory interpretation principles presents strong justification for its
argument-justification the court of appeals should have addressed.
Instead, it seems that the court conducted an incomplete statutory
interpretation due to uncertainty about the result under a more
comprehensive analysis. This hypothesis becomes more likely when
one considers that tax statutes are to be strictly construed against the
state when any ambiguity exists.'13 Thus, underlying the court's
incomplete analysis is the inability of state tax statutes to respond to
new and evolving corporate tax avoidance strategies. When taxpayers
structure transactions to avoid taxation, the state can attempt to
interpret existing law to cover such behavior or else the legislature
must amend the tax statutes simply to disallow the tax benefit going
forward. Wal-Mart Stores East demonstrates that expansive statutory
interpretation can sometimes allow the state to successfully address
tax avoidance. Liberally construing existing statutes, however, may
require misapplication of legal principles and raise the consequent
risk of setting improper precedent. Future courts may rely on such
decisions as a model for similar statutory interpretations; such
reliance would lead to similarly incomplete analyses and the
possibility of failing to effectuate legislative intent."4
113. Polaroid Corp. v. Offerman, 349 N.C. 290, 297, 507 S.E.2d 284, 290 (1998),
abrogated on other grounds by Lenox, Inc. v. Tolson, 353 N.C. 659, 548 S.E.2d 513 (2001);
Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Clayton, 275 N.C. 215, 226, 166 S.E.2d 671, 679 (1969). Note that
this principle does not conflict with the anti-tax avoidance judicial doctrines discussed in
Part III.B. The judicial doctrines provide tax officials with independent authority beyond
that of specific statutes and the related rules of statutory interpretation. See infra Part
III.B.
114. While reading "true earnings" in isolation from the rest of section 105-130.6 may
confer the proper government authority in this case, similar statutory readings may
undermine appropriate state intervention by failing to consider a law's broader, contextual
purpose. Alternatively, incomplete statutory interpretation may unreasonably expand
government power beyond what would have been necessary to address a taxpayer's
actions. For instance, the court of appeals' interpretation of the "true earnings" language
could be read as allowing state officials broad power to force combination whenever they
conclude corporations' activities do not yield a "fair" determination of income. See
KPMG.com, supra note 76 ("The appeals court's definition of 'true earnings' leaves
taxpayers with some uncertainty .... Applying such a definition of 'true earnings' to
determine when a combined return is appropriate provides the state with considerable
power."). Such powers could extend beyond application of the anti-tax avoidance
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III. ANTI-TAX AVOIDANCE PUBLIC POLICY AND THE APPLICABLE
JUDICIAL DOCTRINES
Although the court of appeals' statutory interpretation analysis
was incomplete, public policy supports the court of appeals' ruling
regarding the Secretary of Revenue's authority under section 105-
130.6. Limiting the type of tax avoidance attempted by Wal-Mart
protects state revenues, provides for simpler tax law, promotes
fairness between individual and corporate taxpayers, and promotes
economic efficiency. However, North Carolina courts should utilize
specific anti-tax avoidance doctrines in future cases instead of relying
on incomplete statutory interpretation to justify intervention by the
Secretary of Revenue. Anti-tax avoidance judicial doctrines permit
officials to disallow tax benefits resulting from transactions done
solely to reduce tax liabilities and thus lacking independent economic
substance. The doctrines can therefore be applied more broadly than
the typical, specific tax statutes. 115 Utilizing these doctrines will allow
the state to more fully achieve anti-tax avoidance policy benefits, and
it will protect the legal consistency of the relevant jurisprudence.
A. Policy Benefits of Limiting Tax Avoidance
The tax avoidance literature makes clear that limiting the type of
behavior exhibited in Wal-Mart Stores East yields important policy
benefits. In tax law, the following scenario is quite common: (1)
legislature passes tax provision; (2) taxpayers alter behavior to
circumvent the intent of tax provision; (3) legislature recognizes the
lost revenues and passes a new tax provision to capture the behavior;
(4) repeat the first three steps.116 Anti-tax avoidance policies attempt
to break this cycle by limiting taxpayers' ability to carry out step two
and thereby circumvent the tax law. 17 This might be done by broadly
interpreting tax statutes (as the court of appeals did in Wal-Mart
Stores East) or by giving courts the authority to look at the overall
purpose of the taxpayer's transaction and not just its rigid
doctrines discussed in Part III.B to situations in which taxpayers structure dealings that
have non-tax benefits but in which income is nonetheless transferred out of North
Carolina.
115. Note, however, that statutory codification of the doctrines is itself an option. See
infra note 159 and accompanying text.
116. See Yin, supra note 2, at 1452 (referencing the process of addressing the
"unintended interplay of intricate rules ... through the addition of yet more intricate
rules").
117. See Glickman & Calhoun, supra note 17, at 1181-89; Weisbach, supra note 17, at
88-89; George Zeitlin, United States of America, in TAX AVOIDANCE, TAX EVASION,
supra note 1, at 91, 95.
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formulation. Clearly, preventing tax avoidance helps maximize
government revenues.1 18 Even when the legislature eventually
responds to the tax avoidance, the government has already lost
revenues that should have been collected before the intervention119
Similarly, anti-tax avoidance public policies provide for simpler tax
codes.2 0 If tax law can be applied more broadly, then there is less
need for legislatures to go back and add new, technical tax provisions
whenever taxpayers discover new ways to circumvent the law.
Simpler tax laws allow lawmakers to focus on more important issues,
and they facilitate greater public understanding of the tax code.
Additionally, anti-tax avoidance policies promote fairness across
the tax system, including fairness between individual and corporate
taxpayers. Limiting taxpayers' ability to avoid taxes meant to apply to
them helps ensure that everyone is paying his fair share. This result
may also increase overall compliance and respect for the law more
generally121 as citizens come to perceive the tax code as a more
equitably administered set of laws. Also, it should come as no surprise
that corporations are more skilled than most individuals at crafting
transactions in ways that avoid tax liability. Financial institutions earn
millions of dollars designing tax avoidance strategies and selling them
to interested corporations.12 2 Largely due to corporate success in
avoiding taxes, the effective state corporate tax rate has decreased
over the past twenty years from 6.7% in the 1980s to about 5%
today. 23 Corporations' share of total state tax revenues has fallen as
compared to the percentage paid by individuals. 24 For instance, the
share of total state tax revenues paid by corporations fell from 8.7%
118. Weisbach, supra note 17, at 96.
119. Contrast North Carolina's approach to Wal-Mart Stores East's REIT strategy
with that taken by New York. New York eliminated the captive REIT tax loophole in
2007 by amending its tax code. Drucker, supra note 6. Wal-Mart Stores East had thus
benefited from the captive REIT strategy in New York for a decade without repercussion.
See id.
120. Weisbach, supra note 17, at 112.
121. See Yin, supra note 2, at 1452 ("[A]lilowing taxpayers to obtain unintended tax
relief... underminfes] overall respect for the tax system.").
122. Cf Drucker, supra note 6 (explaining how Ernst & Young, aside from selling its
captive REIT strategy to Wal-Mart, also approached at least thirty banks with the same
proposition); Norris, supra note 21 (describing the monetary incentives to obtaining a
patent on a successful tax-planning strategy).
123. Drucker, supra note 6 (citing a report compiled by the Congressional Research
Service which indicated a decreasing effective corporate tax rate).
124. See IRIS J. LAV ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, FAULTY
FOUNDATIONS: STATE STRUCTURAL BUDGET PROBLEMS AND HOW TO Fix THEM 16-
19 (2005); Drucker, supra note 6 (citing the Rockefeller Institute of Government); Eugene
Kiely, Burden of Taxes Keeps on Shifting, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 17, 2002, at B1.
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in 1991 to 6.6% in 2001 even though corporate profits doubled."z In
North Carolina, the portion of the state's total tax revenues derived
from corporate income tax fell from 8.7% in 1979 to 4.3% in 2002.126
While some of the change in proportional tax revenues is due to
purposeful economic incentives formulated by state policymakers and
other economic factors,27 corporate tax avoidance strategies have had
a significant impact. 2 Thus, limiting tax avoidance can help promote
fairness between corporations and individuals and can ensure that
effective tax rates are more reflective of legislative intent.
Finally, anti-tax avoidance public policies promote economic
efficiency. Efficiency losses occur when tax policy causes individuals
and businesses to make altered choices that result in outcomes no
longer properly aligned with market-based preferences.129 Anti-tax
avoidance policies disincentivize (at least to some degree) taxpayers
from changing their behaviors in response to changes in tax laws. In a
2002 journal article, Professor David A. Weisbach examined the
impact of anti-tax avoidance judicial doctrines 3 ° on economic
efficiency."' Weisbach concluded that these doctrines have the ability
to increase overall economic efficiency by "reducing the marginal
elasticity of taxable income. "132 Basically, anti-tax avoidance policies
make it more difficult to change taxable income into nontaxable
income through altered behavior, 33 and this result reduces behavioral
125. Kiely, supra note 124 (citing the U.S. Commerce Department's Bureau of
Economic Analysis).
126. LAV ET AL., supra note 124, at 19.
127. In recent years, North Carolina has offered sizeable state and local tax incentives
to several corporations-including Dell and Apple-in order to attract new business to the
state. See Sharif Durhams & Kerry Hall, N.C. Offers Incentives for Dell Plant,
CHARLOITE OBSERVER, Nov. 5, 2004, at 1A; Mark Johnson, Senate OKs Apple Tax
Break; Final Vote Monday, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 29, 2009, at 5B.
North Carolina's use of corporate incentives has not been without controversy. See, e.g.,
Jonathan B. Cox, Incentives: Do They Help or Hurt N.C.'s Brand?, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 21, 2007, at 25A; Kerry Hall, Group Sues N.C. over Dell Incentives,
CHARLO'ITE OBSERVER, June 24,2005, at 1D.
12& See William F. Fox, Three Characteristics of Tax Structures Have Contributed to
the Current State Fiscal Crises, 29 ST. TAX NOTEs 375, 381 (2003), available at
http://www.urban.orgUploadedPDF/1000607.pdf ("Tax sheltering is seen as a significant
cause of the divergence that remains unexplained . (citing Mihir A. Desai, The
Corporate Profit Base, Tax Sheltering Activity, and the Changing Nature of Employee
Compensation (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8866,2002))).
129. See HARVEY S. RoSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 304 (7th ed. 2005).
130. See infra Part III.B.
131. Weisbach, supra note 17, at 88.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 94-95.
WAL-MART STORES EAST, INC.
changes and therefore minimizes the distortionary effects of a tax
system:
[The reduced elasticity of taxable income] makes the tax system
more efficient in the sense that a given tax rate will induce
fewer changes in behavior and raise more revenue. This is
analogous to the familiar notion that taxing items with lower
elasticities creates lower deadweight loss. (In fact, we can show
under certain assumptions that the additional tax revenue from
the change in elasticity is directly proportional to the
deadweight loss in the system. The intuition is, as just stated,
that the tax system becomes hard to avoid so that the
deadweight loss from shifting behavior is smaller and,
correspondingly, the tax revenues from a given tax are
higher.)TM
Weisbach also examined the potential efficiency losses that might
result from anti-tax avoidance policies, but he concluded that
policymakers could maximize the net (efficiency) benefits through
proper implementation.135
B. Anti-tax Avoidance Judicial Doctrines
The benefits of anti-tax avoidance public policies suggest that the
court of appeals was correct in upholding the Secretary of Revenue's
actions. However, underlying the court's incomplete statutory
analysis of section 105-130.6 is the inability of state tax statutes to
respond to new and evolving corporate tax avoidance strategies. Wal-
Mart Stores East therefore demonstrates the need for North Carolina
courts to apply the anti-tax avoidance doctrines commonly used by
federal courts. 13 6 In a world where accounting firms can make millions
selling sophisticated tax schemes to large corporations,'137 North
Carolina needs to fully utilize the legal strategies available to limit
egregious acts of tax avoidance-including applying anti-tax
avoidance judicial doctrines where appropriate. Tax officials may not
always be able to identify statutes that grant the specific authority
necessary to address tax avoidance. Where officials can identify
134. Id. at 98 (footnote omitted).
135. Id. at 113.
136. For a discussion of federal usage of anti-tax avoidance judicial doctrines, see infra
notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
137. Cf Drucker, supra note 6 (explaining that Ernst & Young sought to market its
captive REIT strategy to large-scale retailers and banks because, like Wal-Mart, these
companies "have branches in many states and often are liable for lots of state-level
corporate tax").
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possible authority, the courts may be forced to engage in incorrect
statutory interpretation to uphold their actions, running the risk of
setting bad precedent in the process. 3 8 The anti-tax avoidance
doctrines work more broadly by enabling tax officials to disallow tax
benefits resulting from transactions designed solely to reduce tax
liabilities and that lack an independent economic purpose.
Consequently, state officials are able to intervene even when
transactions technically meet the letter of the tax law, and courts are
able to uphold their intervention. Furthermore, these doctrines
function preemptively by sending important signals to tax planners
that certain levels of tax avoidance will not be allowed. 1 9 Despite
these benefits, North Carolina appellate courts have made no
discernible effort to employ anti-tax avoidance judicial doctrines.
The anti-tax avoidance judicial doctrines have a variety of names,
specifically substance over form, business purpose doctrine, economic
substance doctrine, sham transaction doctrine, and step transaction
doctrine.140 The doctrines serve essentially the same purpose: allowing
courts to uphold state intervention when a taxpayer's conduct has
technically produced tax benefits but the conduct was undertaken
with that sole purpose in mind. 4' In some cases, the individual
doctrines are indistinguishable, and application of one produces the
same result as application of another. 42
The anti-tax avoidance doctrines are well-established in federal
case law. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals case Rice's Toyota
World, Inc. v. Commissioner' provides one example.'" In Rice's
138. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
139. Yin, supra note 2, at 1452.
140. Glickman & Calhoun, supra note 17, at 1183. Each doctrine employs a slightly
different rationale. For instance, the economic substance doctrine broadly allows "a court
[to] deny the tax benefits achieved by a business transaction where the transaction itself
lacks any economic benefit without regard to the tax benefits." Id. The substance over
form doctrine allows tax officials and courts to evaluate "the tax results of a particular
transaction ... based on the substance of what took place rather than the formal steps the
taxpayer took." Id. at 1185.
141. See Zeitlin, supra note 117, at 91, 95.
142. For example, a transaction lacking any "economic substance" could also be
labeled as lacking any true "business purpose." Tax officials could therefore intervene
under both the economic substance and business purpose doctrines. See Glickman &
Calhoun, supra note 17, at 1189.
143. 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985).
144. For additional examples of federal application of the doctrines, see ACM P'ship v.
Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231, 245, 263 (3d Cir. 1998) (applying the economic substance doctrine
to disallow tax benefits from a corporate tax shelter based on a partnership agreement
between Colgate-Palmolive and an untaxed business entity); Lerman v. Comm'r, 939 F.2d
44, 45-47, 56 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying the sham transaction doctrine to disallow a tax
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Toyota World, an automobile dealer employed a tax avoidance
strategy involving a computer purchase-and-leaseback transaction. 45
The automobile dealer purchased a $1.5 million computer system
from a seller and immediately leased the computer back to the seller;
the seller then subleased the computer system to another party.
146
Although Rice's Toyota World never had any intention of using the
computer system, it benefited from depreciation deductions on the
asset and thus lowered its overall taxes.147 The Fourth Circuit applied
the sham transaction doctrine and upheld the IRS's disallowance of
the depreciation deductions. 148 The court found that Rice's Toyota
World "did not have profit motivation apart from tax benefits" and
that "the transaction lacked economic substance. ' 149 As Rice's Toyota
World demonstrates, these judicial doctrines allow governments to
obtain more effectively the benefits of anti-tax avoidance public
policy. 5° When a taxpayer structures a transaction that technically
circumvents a tax statute (even though the legislature meant to tax
the activity), officials can disallow the tax savings if the transaction
was designed with no economic rationale but to avoid taxes.
Of course, the anti-tax avoidance doctrines present some
potential problems in addition to their benefits. The most significant
critique of the doctrines is that they can decrease predictability for
taxpayers."' Taxpayers who structure transactions according to the
plain language of statutory law may nonetheless be penalized. This
uncertainty may prove harmful for businesses and individuals that
plan for one result, only to have a notice of tax deficiency filed against
them. There may even be a chilling effect as businesses and
individuals steer clear of legal, wealth-producing transactions for fear
deduction from options transaction losses on the London Metals Exchange specifically
created to reduce tax liability); Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1934),
affd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) (holding that a business reorganization transaction lacked any
purpose other than tax avoidance and was therefore taxable despite a statute making such
transactions nontaxable).
145. Rice's Toyota World, 752 F.2d at 91.
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. Id. at 91, 95. The court also considered the interest deductions that the automobile
dealer had taken on the notes used to secure the computer system. Id. at 95-96. On this
point, the court reversed the IRS's disallowance of the deductions. Id. at 96.
149. Id. at 94, 95.
150. See supra Part III.A.
151. See Robert J. McDonough, Letter, TEl Urges Rejection of Economic Substance
Provisions in the Senate Farm Bill, 60 TAX EXECUTIVE 134, 134 (2008) (arguing against
codification of the economic substance doctrine on the grounds that terms like "relevant,
meaningful, substantial, and reasonably expected are all subjective").
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that the tax benefits may eventually be disallowed.'52 Many
individuals structure transactions in ways meant to avoid taxes,'53 and
widespread enforcement could lead to significant increases in tax
litigation. This outcome raises judicial economy concerns. 15 4 Increased
judicial discretion is also a concern because application of the
doctrines necessarily involves courts determining when actions have
independent economic substance and when they do not.'55
Such criticism of the anti-tax avoidance judicial doctrines is well-
founded. Governments, however, can limit these concerns by
restricting application to the most egregious cases. 56 Taxpayers who
structure transactions with literally zero economic purpose other than
to avoid taxes and who manage to keep significant funds from the
treasury would face enforcement, but others would not.'57 While
making the egregious/non-egregious distinction may be difficult in
close cases, the limitation improves predictability to a large degree. It
also puts tax planners on notice that the most blatant acts of tax
avoidance will not stand. 58
The fact that other states successfully employ the anti-tax
avoidance doctrines further demonstrates their usefulness. Some
legislatures have even passed statutes authorizing tax officials to base
tax assessments upon the doctrines (thereby allowing the courts to
uphold these rulings).'59 In reality, any state could properly apply
152. Jay A. Soled, Use of Judicial Doctrines in Resolving Transfer Tax Controversies, 42
B.C. L. REV. 587, 614 n.119 (2001) ("[L]iberal use of the step transaction doctrine could
have a Draconian chilling effect in [the] area of estate planning.").
153. See generally Yin, supra note 2 (describing the $300-$350 billion annual tax gap in
the United States).
154. See Alexandra M. Walsh, Note, Formally Legal, Probably Wrong: Corporate Tax
Shelters, Practical Reason and the New Textualism, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1541, 1545 (2001)
(listing "judicial activism" as one concern in applying anti-tax avoidance judicial
doctrines).
155. Id.
156. Yin, supra note 2, at 1452 (noting the recommendation of the Joint Committee on
Taxation to "apply a higher level of judicial scrutiny only to the relatively uncommon
transactions bearing the characteristics of tax shelters").
157. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84 (1978) ("[When] there
is a genuine multiple-party transaction with economic substance which is compelled or
encouraged by business or regulatory realities, is imbued with tax-independent
considerations, and is not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features that have meaningless
labels attached, the Government should honor the allocation of rights and duties
effectuated by the parties." (emphasis added)).
158. Yin, supra note 2, at 1452 ("[Anti-tax avoidance standards] might be an important
signal to tax advisors that they should not be giving counsel based on overly literal
interpretations of the law.").
159. The Massachusetts legislature adopted a broad sham transaction statute in 2003.
See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 62C, § 3A (LexisNexis 2008); Glickman & Calhoun, supra note
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these doctrines given the reliance on federal income taxes in
determining state taxable income. Because federal income tax
calculations-based on federal tax law-provide the starting point for
most taxable income calculations, federal tax principles are properly
applied to state-level judicial determinations.16° Several state courts
have accepted this rationale by applying the anti-tax avoidance
doctrines to state taxes completely unrelated to any federal tax
calculations. 161 Regardless of the means by which they are applied,
17, at 1191-92 (recounting the Massachusetts legislature's enactment of the sham
transaction statute). Ohio and New Hampshire have enacted similar statutes. See OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 5703.56 (LexisNexis 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-J:38-a
(LexisNexis 2008); Glickman & Calhoun, supra note 17, at 1191-92 (noting that Ohio and
New Hampshire enacted legislation authorizing their respective tax commissioners to
disallow sham transactions). Ohio's statute reads:
The tax commissioner may disregard any sham transaction in ascertaining any
taxpayer's tax liability. Except as otherwise provided in the Revised Code, with
respect to transactions between members of a controlled group, the taxpayer shall
bear the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that a
transaction or series of transactions between the taxpayer and one or more
members of the controlled group was not a sham transaction. Except as otherwise
provided in the Revised Code, for all other taxpayers, the tax commissioner shall
bear the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that a
transaction or series of transactions was a sham transaction.
§ 5703.56(B).
160. For one example of this approach, see Glickman & Calhoun, supra note 17, at
1210. Note that states largely agree that they can apply the judicial doctrines to adjust a
taxpayer's federal income tax calculations when providing a federal income tax figure is
one step in a state tax calculation. Id. at 1206-07. The North Carolina Department of
Revenue has even taken this approach in administrative hearings:
[T]he Secretary has authority to make an independent determination of the
taxpayer's federal taxable income under the Code and is not limited to accepting
the taxpayer's federal return as filed or even as accepted by the IRS. Included in
this authority to determine federal taxable income is the power to use equitable
doctrines developed at the federal level, such as the step transaction doctrine, for
example. Furthermore, use of these doctrines is implicit in the use of federal
taxable income as the starting point for State net income. I have previously held
that: "Federal taxable income provides the starting point for the calculation of
State net income. Therefore, all federal statutes, doctrines and case law relevant to
determining federal taxable income are available for use by the state."
Rev. Rul. 95-144, 1997 N.C. Tax Lexis 48 (quoting Rev. Rul. 94-199, 1995 N.C. Tax Lexis
35). The issue is whether states should apply these doctrines to independent state tax
calculations, including certain areas of state corporate income tax law. Glickman &
Calhoun, supra note 17, at 1206-07.
161. Glickman & Calhoun, supra note 17, at 1207-11; see, e.g., TD Banknorth, N.A. v.
Dep't of Taxes, 2008 VT 120, 1$ 24-26, 967 A.2d 1148, 1157-58 (explicitly adopting the
economic substance doctrine in Vermont and applying the doctrine in disallowing
classification of holding companies as separate entities for tax purposes); see also infra
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states have become increasingly aggressive in using these doctrines
over the last decade.'62 And there is evidence that the use of the
doctrines on the state level as a means to prevent corporate tax
avoidance will continue to spread.'63
Notably, other states have applied the doctrines in cases similar to
Wal-Mart Stores East. In HMN Financial, Inc. v. Commissioner,64
Minnesota tax officials disallowed deductions for transactions
comprising a captive REIT structure similar to the Wal-Mart REIT
strategy.165 The Minnesota Tax Court upheld the state's actions,
concluding that the scheme lacked any economic substance and should
therefore be disallowed. 66 The court stated that "when the REIT
transactions are viewed as a whole, the only genuine reason for the
captive REIT transactions was to avoid Minnesota tax.' 1 67 Similarly, in
In re Talbots, Inc. ,168 a New York appellate tax court affirmed the
forced combination of Talbots (a women's clothing retailer) with a
subsidiary because the subsidiary itself did not have any non-tax
avoidance purpose. 69 Talbots had created a licensing agreement with a
Chicago-based subsidiary under which Talbots paid the subsidiary
excessive royalties so that it could transfer income from New York in
order to decrease its New York franchise tax.' The subsidiary did not
have any employees, a" and the court concluded that it seemed to have
been created solely to limit Talbots' tax liabilities." 2
An analysis similar to HMN Financial or Talbots would have
worked equally well in Wal-Mart Stores East. In fact, the trial judge in
Wal-Mart Stores East seemed to apply the economic substance
doctrine in his decision. In granting summary judgment for the state,
Judge Horton observed:
Plaintiffs [Wal-Mart Stores East] do not deny the facts
demonstrating the circular journey taken by the "rents" paid by
these plaintiffs, but contend that on each leg of the journey
notes 164-72 and accompanying text (describing state court decisions that have applied
anti-tax avoidance doctrines to non-federal tax matters).
162. See Glickman & Calhoun, supra note 17, at 1188-97.
163. See id. at 1182.
164. No. 7911-R, 2009 WL 1506929 (Minn. Tax May 27, 2009).
165. Id. at *18.
166. Id. at *25.
167. Id. at *22.
168. No. 820168, 2007 WL 967883 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Mar. 22, 2007).
169. Id. at *43-45.
170. Id. at *11.
171. Id. at *6.
172. Id. at *45.
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plaintiffs were only taking advantage of a lawful deduction
afforded them by then-existing tax law. Such a piecemeal
approach exalts form over substance, however.... There is no
evidence in this record of any economic impact (apart from the
obvious state tax savings) of the transaction to plaintiffs....
... [T]here is no evidence that the rent transaction, taken as a
whole, has any real economic substance apart from its
beneficial effect on plaintiffs' North Carolina tax liability. It is
particularly difficult for the court to conclude that rents were
actually "paid," when they are subsequently returned to the
payor corporation.'73
Following the trial court decision, some commentators even
concluded that Judge Horton had applied an anti-tax avoidance
doctrine in ruling against Wal-Mart Stores East.174 The North Carolina
Court of Appeals, however, completely ignored Judge Horton's
"economic substance" language and relied solely on straightforward
statutory interpretation, even though Wal-Mart Stores East addressed
the economic substance issue in its appellate brief and presented
arguments about whether the REIT truly had any independent
economic substance. 175 The court of appeals' decision was unfortunate
since it is likely that applying an anti-tax avoidance judicial doctrine
could have easily decided the case.1 76 Wal-Mart Stores East formulated
the multi-million dollar captive REIT structure for the sole purpose of
avoiding North Carolina taxes. There were no independent economic
benefits to the scheme because rent paid to W-M REBT was cycled
173. Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc. v. Hinton, No. 06-CVS-3928, slip op. at 17-18, 23 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Dec. 31, 2007), affd, _ N.C. App. -, 676 S.E.2d 634 (2009).
174. See, e.g., HMN Fin., Inc. v. Comm'r, No. 7911-R, 2009 WL 1506929, at *22 (Minn.
Tax May 27, 2009) (citing the Wal-Mart Stores East trial court opinion as an example of a
court applying an anti-tax avoidance doctrine); Glickman & Calhoun, supra note 17, at
1211 n.159 (same).
175. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 42, at 18-22.
176. Wal-Mart Stores East argued that the captive REIT structure had independent
economic substance. Id. However, its stated arguments were unconvincing and essentially
pointed out that W-M REBT and Wal-Mart Stores East were "separate and distinct
entities" under the law. Id. at 19. Wal-Mart Stores East stated that the entities had
different legal rights and responsibilities (including W-M REBT's right to collect rent and
ability to use the land as collateral), entered into numerous contracts together, and
engaged in fair (not sham) rental payments. Id. at 19-21. The issue, however, is whether
Wal-Mart's creation of these entities served any purpose beyond state tax avoidance. As
Judge Horton and others (for example, Drucker, supra note 6) pointed out, Wal-Mart's
REIT corporate structure appeared to be nothing more than a multi-million dollar tax
avoidance scheme.
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right back to Wal-Mart Stores East in the form of dividends.'77 Thus,
the Secretary of Revenue could properly ignore the tax deductions that
Wal-Mart Stores East claimed for rental payments to W-M REBT
under one of the anti-tax avoidance doctrines. Forced combination of
the individual corporate entities would not have even been necessary
(though, as Talbots reveals, it certainly would have been an option 7 8).
At the very least, the court of appeals could have offered the anti-tax
avoidance judicial doctrines as additional support for its statutory
interpretation conclusion-using the doctrines to allow state
intervention in close questions of statutory authority.
CONCLUSION
Although the North Carolina Court of Appeals reached the
correct result from a public policy standpoint in Wal-Mart Stores East,
it did so after conducting an incomplete statutory analysis. The court of
appeals' incomplete statutory interpretation reveals the inability of
statutes to reliably address instances of tax avoidance. North Carolina
courts must be willing to apply specific anti-tax avoidance judicial
doctrines in future cases of egregious tax avoidance. Anti-tax
avoidance doctrines work more broadly than straightforward statutory
interpretation by disallowing tax benefits that result from taxpayers
conducting transactions solely to reduce tax liabilities and thus lacking
independent economic purpose. Applying the doctrines helps achieve
important policy benefits, including protecting state revenues,
providing for simpler tax law, promoting fairness between individual
and corporate taxpayers, and promoting economic efficiency.
Additionally, limiting application to egregious cases of misconduct
would largely avoid the negative consequences of the doctrines.
Applying one of the anti-tax avoidance doctrines in Wal-Mart Stores
East would have protected the logical consistency of North Carolina
statutory interpretation jurisprudence and would have disincentivized
future acts of tax avoidance. Because the Secretary of Revenue will not
always be able to find a specific statutory provision under which to
attack corporate tax avoidance behavior, the courts must be willing to
apply the judicial doctrines in future cases if North Carolina is to fully
achieve the benefits of anti-tax avoidance public policy.
JEREMY M. WILSON
177. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text (providing background discussion of
Wal-Mart's captive REIT tax avoidance strategy).
178. In re Talbots, Inc., No. 820168, 2007 WL 967883, at *38, *45 (N.Y. Div. Tax App.
Mar. 22, 2007).
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